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Abstract: The hegemony of neoliberalism has seen the market virtually canonised with 
mainstream neoclassical economics successfully shaping a general understanding of the 
market as being synonymous with the economy and capitalism more generally. But 
mainstream economics portrays the market as a normative ideal framed around a set of 
abstract assumptions incompatible with reality. This conception and assumptions have been 
roundly challenged and there is a burgeoning discourse cogently demonstrating that real-world 
markets do not emerge in some vacuum, are persistently vulnerable to failure, influence the 
nature and relationships of individuals, and their operation depends on highly complex non-
market institutional arrangements into which they are deeply embedded. But economists have 
shown little interest, until more recently, in the ‘real constitution’ of markets. In seeking to 
analyse real world markets, this paper posits a method for empirical investigation to explain 
the structure, operation, interactions and outcomes of actually existing markets. 
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The market is now considered by the vast majority of mainstream economists, policymakers, 
the media and politicians as being the far superior coordinating mechanism for all capitalist 
economies.  
… by century’s end, to speak ill of markets narrowed one’s access to ears, and progressive 
economists quickly learned to reformulate criticisms as suggestions about improving market 
performance. Any hint that one considered markets to be part of the problem rather than the 
key to the solution to any economic problem was sure to blow one’s cover in the economics 
profession as well as policy circles (Hahnel 2007: 1140) 
Free market fundamentalism has assumed “an almost biblical status” (Giroux 2009) and public 
policies have become embedded with market-based mechanisms based on economic concepts 
derived from the logic of perfect competitive markets. As a consequence there has been 
substantial change to markets which have traditionally supplied public goods such as 
electricity, water, education, health insurance, public housing, infrastructure, and services for 
the disabled, aged and unemployed. Most notably, direct provision by government of these 
goods and services has been supplanted and there have been significant pricing changes.  
 




 The rationale for these market-based policies has been couched in terms of the need 
for greater economic efficiency.  Consequently contemporary public policies are almost 
exclusively framed in abstract terms of competition, efficiency, supply and demand, or the 
need to address market failures. This is the lexicon of neoclassical economics which portrays 
the market as a normative ideal framed around a set of abstract assumptions, where a market 
is conceived “as a space for carrying out identical transactions which bear on one well-defined 
product and lead to the determination of one price” (Coriat and Weinstein 2005: 2). But 
abstract terms, identical transactions, one product and one price cannot explain the operation 
and outcomes of these transformed markets which characterise contemporary capitalism.  
Markets are not purely about relationships between inanimate objects, between 
goods and services, which is the strong impression evoked by any mainstream economics text 
or government publication. Markets involve people, their preferences (influenced by opinions, 
values and advertising) and relationships with others. Market prices also will influence 
people’s accessibility to, and participation in, a market.  
Those markets, shaped by market-based public policies, determine – to a significant 
measure - the health, standard of living and social inclusion of the population. How can we 
understand, and explain the impact on society, of these ‘restructured’ real world markets 
given that economists have, until recently, shown little interest in the “emergence and real 
constitution of markets” (ibid: 1)?1
The purpose of this paper is to develop a framework for empirical analysis of real 
world markets to explain the structure, operation, interactions and outcomes of actually 
existing markets. “A clearheaded perception of how different institutions actually work ... from 
the market to the institutions of the state” (Sen 2009) will establish a credible foundation for 
the development of options to ameliorate the impoverishment of capitalism and its “greed, 
cruelty, corruption and iniquitous power relations” (Giroux 2009).  
 How are actually existing markets organised? What ensures 
their ongoing functioning? What is the nature of the goods and services provided by these 
markets? How does this differ from previous provision? What issues or barriers do participants 
encounter when engaging with these markets? To what extent do these markets ensure 
adequate provision to those on lower incomes? What outcomes are these markets delivering?  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 focuses on the conceptualisation of the 
market and discusses the shifting attitudes to the notion of the self-regulating market held by 
mainstream economists and policymakers and hence, their perception of the relationship 
between market and state. This leads to a discussion of the success by neoclassical economics, 
during the hegemony of neoliberalism, in shaping a general understanding of the market as 
being synonymous with the economy and capitalism more generally accompanied by a set of 
assumptions incompatible with reality. Challenges to the neoclassical conception are outlined 
which situate the market as one of capitalism’s multiplicity of institutions. Drawing from the 
multiplicity of meanings which may be attributed to the market, and other related dimensions, 
Section 3 distinguishes twelve key delineating features of markets from which a framework to 
analyse actually existing markets is posited. A final section provides concluding comments.  
 
 
                                                          
1 The few notable empirical studies have included Garcia-Parpet (2007), Kirman and Vignes (1992), and 
PSIRU (2008). 
 




2 How is the market conceptualised? 
 
2.1 The oscillating conceptions of ‘self-equilibrating’ markets 
The 1930s Great Depression “called into question the predominant conviction that 
government should balance its budget, maintain the gold standard, and let business 
reequilibrate of its own accord during economic downturns” (Weir and Skocpol 1985: 107). 
Most economists held the view that governments should let markets function free of 
institutional impediments because ‘free markets’ were not the cause of economic instability 
and/or stagnation.  
After the Second World War, there was a 180 degree turn in this thinking with the 
widespread adoption by democratically-elected governments of Keynesian economic 
management. “Its central feature was acceptance of the so-called mixed economy – that is, a 
capitalist framework within which state enterprise was tolerated and the government held 
responsible for managing the economy” (Armstrong, Glyn et al 1991: 136). The approach of 
governments became one of using regulation, legislation, collective agreements, and monetary 
and fiscal policies, to ‘manage’ market mechanisms which if left ‘untamed’, it was advocated, 
would not provide full employment, steady growth and economic stability. This economic 
management approach redefined the roles of the state and the market because it rejected the 
notion of the capitalist economy having a self-correcting ability (Whitwell 1986: 38).  
But, from the 1970s onwards, there has been a very marked shift by mainstream 
economists and policymakers to the notion of ‘free and unencumbered’ markets being the 
most efficient method to coordinate the activities of contemporary capitalist economies. 
Nearly all mainstream economists believe – at least until the 2008 admission by former Federal 
Reserve Chairman Greenspan of a ‘flaw’ – that markets are self-correcting (Skidelsky 2009). 
The market had risen, to borrow from Boyer (1997), like a phoenix. Consequently, government 
intervention has been increasingly portrayed as detrimental not beneficial to efficient market 
operations as the ideology of neoliberalism has metamorphosised into the “central guiding 
principle of economic thought and management” (Harvey 2005: 2). The relationship of the 
state to the market is a core idea of neoliberalism. The market has primacy and virtually all 
economic and social problems are seen as having a market solution. However, neoliberals 
recognise that “market order requires a particular kind of state to secure it” (Gamble 2006: 
22), a strong state to overcome obstacles and provide necessary support to ensure a ‘free’ 
market is paramount.  
 
2.2 The neoliberal market and neoclassical economics 
Market discipline, competition and commodification denote neoliberalism which has been 
described as: 
a mixture of neoclassical economic fundamentalism, market regulation in place of state 
guidance, economic redistribution in favor of capital (known as supply-side economics), moral 
authoritarianism with an idealized family at its center, international free trade principles 
(sometimes inconsistently applied), and a thorough intolerance of trade unionism (Moody 
1997: 119-20, emphasis added). 
Four basic concepts underpin neoliberalism - the free market, market failure, market 
primacy, and interrelationships of market, state and politics (Chang 2002). But the definition of 
 




the free market, and thus state intervention, is fraught with difficulty because: (a) the 
participants, and terms of participation, in all markets is determined by some form of state 
regulation; and (b) the same action by the state may be considered an intervention by one 
society but not another, depending on the legitimacy and hierarchy of the underlying rights-
obligations structure for market participants (ibid). The definition of market failure is similarly 
fraught, in Chang’s view, because the notion of failure only makes sense in relation to what is 
considered to be an ‘ideal’ market (Chester 2008c). But, as Chang demonstrates, that regarded 
by one person as failure (e.g. income inequality) may be seen by another as the normal 
functioning of the market.  
Neoclassical economics has been criticised by the 1991 Nobel Economics Prize 
recipient for its increasing abstraction of analysis and preoccupation with price determination 
resulting in study of “a system that lives in the minds of economists but not on earth … The 
firm and market appear by name but they lack any substance” (Coase (1992: 714). 
Nevertheless, neoclassical economics has successfully shaped  
the general understanding of what a “market”, a “market economy”, and even an “economy” 
in general is, or should be. In its basic approach, it hardly has anything to do with the reality of 
markets … however, it has been made … into an official economic thought system of capitalist-
market economies and, thus, a general theoretical and normative reference and benchmark for 
economic analysis, economic systems and policies. This justification of the “market” has been 
achieved through the definition of a decentralised economy in which prices play a central role 
as coordinating devices … While the “market” is an ambiguous positive-normative ideal, it 
nevertheless is considered not only an adequate reflection of the capitalist-market reality but 
also serves as a sound policy guideline for its reform (Elsner 2008:  370, original emphasis)  
But what does neoclassical economics tell us about the market? First, it assumes that 
products are optimally allocated in a perfectly informed, atomistic world. Second, the market 
is attributed self-equilibrating properties because it is assumed to clear automatically via 
price adjustments i.e. prices respond to changes in demand or supply, finding equilibrium at 
the price at which the quantity supplied equals the quantity demanded. Accordingly, these 
oscillations underpin a systemic stability across markets for all goods and services and ensure 
an optimal allocation of resources between competing needs. Yet this self-equilibrating 
nature of the market rests on numerous assumptions such as identical consumers behaving 
rationally because they are perfectly informed about all the available alternatives, zero 
transaction costs, no trading at disequilibrium prices, and infinitely rapid velocities of prices 
and quantities (Blaug 2002: 40-41). In addition, it is assumed that communication between 
market participants is solely through price signals, market participants are anonymous, 
interaction in the market is horizontal, virtually all transactions are commensurable, all goods 
are non-collective and the market is not place sensitive (Crouch 2005: 115).  
These assumptions mean that market equilibrium can only be achieved if multiple 
conditions are fulfilled such as: numerous traders so that no one can exert any monopoly 
power; a finite number of goods and their quality is common knowledge; there are no public 
goods or externalities of production; returns to scale are constant; all equity issues are 
completely separate from the objective of efficiency; and, the preferences of buyers and 
sellers are convex i.e. marginal utility of any good and the marginal productivity of a factor 
must be declining  concurrently (Boyer 1997: 72-74). This means that multiple and quite 
precise conditions are necessary to guarantee optimal market equilibrium. 
Notwithstanding any perceived incompatibility of neoclassical assumptions with 
economic reality, this paradigm maintains that the market should be left ‘unfettered’ from 
 




state interventions to ensure its ‘efficient’ workings are allowed to determine output and 
price.  Free, competitive markets allocate resources and distribute income most efficiently, it is 
argued, because they will tend towards a (Pareto) optimal situation which occurs when no 
change can improve the position of one individual (as judged by herself) without a negative 
impact on the position of another individual (as judged by that individual).  
However, six sources of market failure which threaten the achievement of ‘Pareto 
efficiency’ have been deemed to warrant government intervention. These are: a failure of 
perfect competition; a failure to supply public goods (e.g. defence or national security); 
negative externalities of production such as pollution; markets which provide incomplete 
goods and services (e.g. insurance); imperfect information to consumers (e.g. weather 
forecasts); and, ‘macroeconomic disturbances’ such as high levels of unemployment and 
inflation (Stiglitz 2000: 76-90).  The notion of environmental problems as negative externalities 
arising from market failure provides a strong exemplar of the policy approach advocated by 
mainstream neoclassical economics. This less than optimal market outcome, according to 
mainstream neoclassicists, can be ‘corrected’ with the imposition of economic incentives to 
create the ‘correct price’ which will reduce externalities and lead to some optimum level of 
environmental control. More recently, this view of environmental problems has been 
challenged by one that contends ill-defined property rights cause markets to fail, and clarified 
rights will enable negotiation between parties in ‘free markets’ (Hahnel and Sheeran 2009). 
But, it is only in these circumstances of market failure – which jeopardise the holy grail 
of economic efficiency – that justify any government intervention for mainstream economics.2
 
  
Government intervention is, according to this view, not warranted to “protect its citizens from 
misfortune and the random blows of fate by providing the most basic rights and levels of 
collective security and protection” (Giroux 2009). The issue of market failure is of greatest 
importance to neoclassical economics because this school is about the market and the market 
is the economy; “if the market fails, the economy fails” (Chang 2002: 545). 
2.3 Markets in the real world 
The neoclassical conception of the market, and its incompatible assumptions with reality, have 
been roundly challenged (e.g. Blaug 2002; Goodwin, Nelson et al 2005; Prasch 1995; Simon 
1991; Sherman, Hunt et al 2008). There is also a burgeoning discourse cogently demonstrating 
that real-world markets do not emerge in some vacuum, are persistently vulnerable to failure, 
influence the nature and relationships of individuals, and their operation depends on highly 
complex non-market institutional arrangements into which they are deeply embedded (e.g. 
Altvater 1993; Boyer 1997; Coriat and Weinstein 2005; Martinez 2009; North 1990; Peck and 
Theodore 2007; Prasch 2008; Tsakalotos 2004). Moreover, self-regulating market mechanisms 
cannot coordinate fictitious commodities such as money, labour and the environment because 
their supply is not in response to changing relative prices (Polyani 2001). A group of 
sociologists have also initiated detailed analyses of the actual creation and functioning of 
markets, especially financial markets, which have debunked neoclassical notions of  markets 
being atomistic and anonymous, showing instead a range of behavioural rules, relationships, 
                                                          
2 Stiglitz (2000: 87) also argues that even if Pareto efficiency is achieved, government intervention may 
be warranted to achieve greater equality of income distribution and/or if the government “knows what 
is in the best interests of individuals”. 
 




and skills required for participation (e.g. Callon 1998; Callon, Millo et al 2007; MacKenzie 
2007a, 2009; MacKenzie, Muniesa et al 2007). 
This body of work situates the market as one of a multiplicity of formal and informal 
institutions comprising capitalism. “All institutions, including the market … are defined in 
relation to the structure of the rights and obligations of the relevant actors” (Chang 2007: 7) 
which in the case of the market includes the institutional arrangements that determine 
and/or regulate market participants, and the objects and process of market exchange. As 
these ‘rights and obligations’ are deemed to be the result of politics, the market – like all 
institutions – is considered to be a political construct. Property rights, and the entitlements 
bestowed on market participants are not free of politics, nor are the determination of 
interest rates and wages which impact on every sector of the economy, along with numerous 
state actions to ‘protect’ market participants. Far from being ‘natural’, “markets are the fruit 
of complex social and historical developments” (Coriat and Weinstein 2005: 1) with politics, 
and thus the state, being integral to their creation and functioning. 
Consequently, this view of the actually existing market assigns a far more active role 
to the state. Market outcomes result from a myriad of institutional arrangements and 
processes all of which are influenced by the state and politics. Accordingly, a view of market 
outcomes solely in terms of output and price provides a partial, and thus inaccurate view, of 
economic reality. Therefore, if we are to provide a more accurate view, and not framed in 
abstraction, how can we analyse a market?  
 
3 How can we analyse a market? 
 
Boyer (1997: 62-66) contends that at least six different ‘types’ of markets are distinguishable 
by the space and time horizon in which the market occurs. Markets may be: periodic and 
itinerant (e.g. antiques, food); a temporary ‘screening’ device to procure the least costly of 
proposals and which then become a bilateral commercial contract (e.g. infrastructure); an 
aggregation over a geographical area or for one product (e.g. the beef market); an abstract 
mechanism to make compatible a series of ‘individual supplies and demands’ which adjusts 
and converges to a unique price (e.g. the abstract market of neoclassical economics); a set of 
interdependent markets (e.g. a population expresses joint demand upon thousands of 
commodity markets); or, a market may exist whenever social actors compete for limited 
resources, positions or status (e.g. the application of rationality, equilibrium and market by the 
Chicago school of economics to marriage, crime, donations to churches etc).  Thus the market 
is polysemic, it has a multiplicity of meanings because of the differing location and temporal 
nature of markets. If we are seeking to understand real world markets, this aspect signals the 
need to delineate a market’s space and time horizon. 
Three other contributions also signal further aspects to illuminate the workings and 
outcomes of real world markets. According to Prasch (2008) the analytical key to 
understanding market relations lies in the evolving system of property rights and contract law 
which have created increasingly complex markets.  The organisation of economic exchange, 
through the two dimensions of the formation and differentiation of economic agents around 
the exchange process and differences in the specificities of exchange processes, is posited by 
Harvey and Randles (2002) as a possible – albeit more abstract - framework for analysis. On 
 




the other hand, Tordjman  suggests ‘embedded behaviours’ will “circumscribe the domain of 
markets’ (1998: 2) which can be illuminated by considering the ways in which the object of 
exchange are defined, the market participants, market processes and how society is shaped by 
markets. 
 Drawing from these propositions about space and time, the influence of property 
rights and contract law, the dimensions and embedded behaviours shaping the organisation of 
exchange, twelve core features of markets can be distinguished. These features progress from 
the relatively simple to the more complex but enable us to move from the abstract to the 
more concrete if the intent is to undertake an empirical analysis of real world markets. The 
twelve core features of markets are presented in Box 1 below. 
 
 
Box 1: Distinguishing features of markets 
 
 
1. A market is a location where buyers and sellers interact. 
 
2. A market may be a physical location but does not need to be as evidenced by eBay, an internet 
auction. 
 
3. Goods may be bought and sold on local or global markets. 
 
4. A commodity market requires a monetary system. 
 
5. Markets may be for intermediate or final goods. 
 
6. Exchange – of some object, promise, service or privilege – is the fundamental event in a market. 
 
7. A market is a locus of repeated exchanges. 
 
8. What may be exchanged in a market will depend upon a legal system of property rights. 
 
9. Implicit or explicit contracts govern the conditions under which property is exchanged. 
 
10. Rules about transactions organise how buyers and sellers interact, and who may be a buyer and a 
seller. 
 
11. Organised behaviour allows continuity of market operation. 
 
12. Rules about the provision of information (including about the quality of the good) enable sellers 
to propose a price and enable buyers to accept or negotiate another. 
 
 




These twelve distinguishing features of markets encompass rules about transactions 
and information, the nature of goods, mechanisms to facilitate exchange, property rights and 
space. More importantly, these features, I suggest, foreshadow a concrete form of Tjordman’s 
(2004) ‘agenda of questions’ to address if we are to develop a realistic understanding of 
actually existing markets. These questions provide an analytical framework and are presented 
in Box 2. 
 
 
Box 2: Questions to analyse actually existing markets 
 
 
 What is the commodity ‘bought and sold’? How are these goods or services defined? To what 
extent have these definitions changed with the “virtual canonization of market organisation” 
(Nelson 2005: 1)? 
 
 Who are the market participants (individuals, groups or organisations)? Who transacts with who? 
Are intermediaries involved? 
 
 What are ‘rules’ or protocols which determine eligibility or ineligibility for ongoing access to a 
market? Are there legal and political decisions, or compromises, which determine who 
participates? 
 
 How does the interaction between ‘buyers’ and ‘sellers’ take place? Are particular behaviours 
forbidden? Are there implicit rules influencing the behaviour of market participants? 
 
 Is there a physical or virtual market location and how is this organised? Is the sphere of interaction 
local or global 
 
 What are the institutions, organisations, legislation or associations that organise the functioning of 
a market, as well as their responsibilities and enforcement tools to ‘make the market work’? 
 
 How is price determined? Are prices set outside or in the market? If it is a price-setting market, 
does this lead to different bilateral prices? 
 
 What is the form of competition in each market in light of the number of traders, distribution of 
ownership and market power? 
 
 What information is available to whom? Where is it available? What skills are needed to access or 
process market information? 
 








It is my contention that an analytical grid is presented by these questions which can be 
used to dissect the structure, operation, participants, behaviours, rules, price setting and more 
to provide a realistic picture of real world markets. In comparison, neoclassical economic 
analysis assumes a form of market organisation – pure competition, duopoly, oligopoly, or 
monopoly – and then analyses output, price and cost outcomes within this context (Gould 
1980).  
 This analytical grid has been applied to five Australian markets, four of which are 
longstanding markets previously providing goods and services directly and solely by 
government (electricity, water, housing for low-income Australians, and services for the 
unemployed) and the other is a market currently being established (carbon trading) (Chester 
2009). All five markets have, or will have, a widespread impact across the Australian 
community.  
The analysis unequivocally demonstrated a very different picture of the operation and 
outcomes of markets from that promulgated by mainstream economics which is embedded in 
public policy. For example (ibid):  
 eligibility to participate in a market is not met by the setting or payment of a price but by 
first meeting pre-determined criteria, usually set by regulators;  
 ongoing market participation is not assured even if eligibility criteria are satisfied and 
payment is made for a good or service;  
 government is directly influencing the demand and supply sides of each market analysed;  
 regulators actively determine prices in each of the five markets analysed;  
 intermediaries are strongly evident and commonly as market operators;  
 the vast majority of interaction between market participants is via the internet;  
 quite complex and detailed information is available to buyers relating to their 
participation, obligations, payments terms, penalties and performance data about 
suppliers;  
 each market is structured around a very complex legislative and regulatory regime;  
 there is strong evidence of different market types and the extent of competition includes  
contested and managed markets, monopoly franchise, oligopoly and imperfect 
competition;  
 government is a very dominant participant in all markets, performing multiple roles as 
regulator, owner of significant supplier assets, manager of stock, manager of contested 
markets, market operator, and buyer;  
 despite government interventions, and significant price increases, the key outcomes in the 
majority of markets analysed show that supply is not meeting demand and one market 
(housing for low-income Australians) is evidence of chronic market failure; and 
 market power and concentration was found to be strongly present in the majority of 
markets analysed.  
The analysis strongly illustrated that there is not one but a spectrum of contemporary 
market configurations and exceedingly complex governance regimes. Thus, the organisation of 
a capitalist economy, such as Australia, which attributes a leading role to competitive markets, 
 




can only be explained by ascertaining: the institutions, legislation, organisations, or 
interactions that organise the functioning of various markets; the series of commodities for 
which the supply and demand of is heavily determined by market institutions, including 
regulation by the state; and the forms of competition according to the number of traders, 
ownership distribution, market power, and the mechanisms to resolve capacity issues or 
structural changes (Boyer 1997: 70). These are the ‘keys’ to understanding and explaining the 
existence and operation of markets in a capitalist economy. 
 
4 Concluding comments 
 
In the 1930s most economists were of the view that markets were self-equilibrating, not the 
cause of economic instability and government should, as they did, let markets function free of 
institutional impediments. Post World War 2, Keynesian economic management rejected the 
notion of the capitalist economy having a self-correcting ability. However, with the ascendancy 
of neoliberalism from the 1970s onwards, the rhetoric of mainstream economists and 
policymakers has strongly admonished government intervention as detrimental to efficient 
market operations with the market advocated as the solution for virtually all economic and 
social problems. Mainstream neoclassical economics has very successfully portrayed the 
market as synonymous with the economy and capitalism but as a normative ideal framed 
around a set of abstract assumptions. This does not explain the structure, functioning, 
outcomes or implications of actually existing markets. 
 The market has a multiplicity of meanings which yield the following features – a 
location for repeated exchanges between buyers and sellers which may be physical or virtual, 
may involve intermediate or final goods, may be local or global and which is underpinned by 
property rights, implicit or explicit contracts, rules about transactions and information creating 
organised behaviour and continuity of operation. It is these features which signal a set of 
questions to address in order to generate a realistic understanding of the structure and 
operation of actually existing markets. This is the analytical framework which this paper has 
sought to develop. 
The analytical framework posited explicitly recognises the different types of markets 
that can be discerned, the relationship to property rights, and the dimensions and behaviours 
shaping the organisation of exchange through the delineation of twelve core features of 
markets. These features establish the set of questions which frame and guide the analysis.  
It is also abundantly clear from the foregoing discussion, and the albeit brief discussion 
of the analysis of five Australian markets, the market is such a complex institution that it 
cannot be distilled or equated to the sum of bilateral relationships as is neoclassical 
economics’ want. A market’s functioning and ‘constitution’ can only be understood within the 
context of this empirical complexity as well as by reference to other markets given the 
diversity and specificities of each.  The analytical framework posited in this paper contributes a 
basis to do that. 
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